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Abstract
Despite major advances in quantitative approaches to natural resource manage-
ment, there has been resistance to using these tools in the actual practice of managing
ecological populations. Given a management problem and a set of ecological and eco-
nomic assumptions, translated into a model, optimization methods can be used to
solve for the most cost effective management actions. However, when the underlying
assumptions are not met, such methods can potentially lead to decisions that harm
the environment and economy. Managers who develop decisions based on past experi-
ence and judgment, without the aid of theoretical models, can potentially learn about
the system, constantly modifying their mental models to develop flexible management
strategies. However, these strategies are often based on subjective criteria and equally
invalid and often unstated assumptions. Therefore it is unclear which approach works
best for managing biological populations. In this paper, we explore how well humans,
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using their experience and judgment, manage simulated fishery populations in an on-
line computer game and compare their management outcomes to the performance of
a variety of mathematical models. We consider harvest decisions generated using four
different theoretical models: (1) the exact same model used to simulate the population
dynamics observed in the game, with the values of all parameters known [as a con-
trol], (2) the same model, but with unknown parameter values that must be estimated
from observed data during the game, (3) models that are structurally different from
those used to generate the game dynamics and (4) a model that ignores age struc-
ture. Humans on average perform much worse than the models in cases 1 - 3, but
in a small minority of scenarios, models produce worse outcomes than those resulting
from humans making decisions based on experience and judgment. When the models
ignore age structure, they generated poorly performing management decisions, but still
outperformed humans using experience and judgment 66 percent of the time.
keywords: adaptive management, bioeconomics, conservation, fisheries management, opti-
mal harvest, natural resource management, expert opinion, ecological modeling
Introduction
In the past 50 years, environmental management has benefited from major advances
in decision science. Perhaps the most influential concept amongst these advances is adaptive
management, the iterative process of modeling, hypothesis testing, optimization, acting, and
monitoring to reduce uncertainty and maximize net benefits (Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986).
Government agencies, scientists and theoreticians widely agree that adaptive management is
the best way to manage a biological population in cases where the benefit of different actions
strongly depends on uncertain ecological processes that can be learned through observing
system changes in response to management. (Possingham et al., 2001; Stankey et al., 2005;
Nichols and Williams, 2006; Walters, 2007; Williams and Brown, 2012; Game et al., 2014).
While managers often do practice some components of adaptive management by col-
lecting data and making decisions based on their findings, with the exception of a few large
scale management programs in fisheries, waterfowl, forestry and conservation (e.g. Sainsbury,
3
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1988; Moore and Conroy, 2006; Nichols et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 2015), managers rarely
use dynamic modeling and optimization, and instead use their experience, intuition and best
judgment as a substitute for formal system analysis (Johnson and Williams, 2015). This is
despite the fact that many scientists have proposed management plans based on dynamic
optimization methods, for a variety of ecological systems, which in theory offer managers
substantial cost savings and improved environmental outcomes (e.g. McCarthy et al., 2001;
Westphal et al., 2003; Gerber et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2006; Asano et al., 2008; Martin
et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2011; Probert et al., 2011; Rout et al., 2014; Hughes et al., 2014;
Helmstedt et al., 2014).
One potential reason for the resistance to using mathematical modeling in manage-
ment is that it’s unclear how much modeling and optimization actually improve management
outcomes over expert opinion. This is especially a concern when model-based decisions are
calculated using passive dynamic optimization (Johnson and Williams, 2015). The defining
feature of passive optimization is that the method does not consider the value of information
while solving for the optimal action, meaning a manager never sacrifices expected gains,
given current information, in order to learn about the system and potentially improve long
term benefits.
When the value of improved system knowledge resulting from each action is incor-
porated explicitly into the objective, the optimization is referred to as active adaptive man-
agement. In other words, while both passive and active adaptive management incorporate
learning based on observations during system monitoring, only active adaptive manage-
ment values the future benefit of knowledge resulting from decisions made in the present.
Unfortunately, unless a manager is willing to drastically simplify their description of the
management problem (e.g. Hauser and Possingham, 2008), active adaptive management is
computationally infeasible, and hence passive optimization is the predominant method for
solving theoretical management problems (Johnson and Williams, 2015).
Humans can possibly use intuition and past experience to incorporate the benefit
of learning into decision making, without the aid of mathematical models. However, such
decisions are subjective. Can humans use their flexibility to learn about the system to out-
perform a model-based, passive adaptive management program? Unfortunately, it is difficult
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to answer this question because experiments in management are, in general, not repeatable.
That is, once a manager makes a decision based on their expertise, it is usually impossible to
compare the outcome to how well an alternative decision, aided by a mathematical model,
would have done.
In this paper we take a first step towards quantifying the economic benefits of using
simple dynamic models and passive optimization methods, rather than human judgment,
to manage biological populations, by comparing the outcomes from humans and models
managing simulated populations. To do this, students in multiple college classes played an
online game where they managed a simulated fishery. The data from each game was saved
on a server, and therefore we were able to compare exactly how mathematical models would
have played, compared to how the students actually played, for each unique instance of the
game.
Methods
Experiments
Students played two online “games”, accessed using a web browser, where they earned
“points” corresponding to the profits from managing a simulated herring and a simulated
pacific salmon fishery. Below we describe the experiment for the herring fishery game and
then explain how the salmon game was different.
The students played the game using their laptops during the lecture period of two
courses, “Environmental Conservation” at Cornell University and “Principles of Biology” at
Ithaca College, and at the “Graduate Student Science Colloquium” at Cornell University.
Prior to managing each fishery, the students filled out a multiple choice survey that asked
them their major, educational experience, fishing experience, and environmental manage-
ment experience. See S1 in the online supplementary information for a copy of the survey.
After the survey, each game showed a page of directions describing the fish stock’s
population dynamics. In addition, Matthew Holden, the game facilitator, read a standard-
ized script aloud to each class, reiterating the points listed on the page. This included
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statements about the existence of a fishery carrying capacity, measurement error, environ-
mental randomness out of the managers control and how their performance would be scored.
See the online supplementary information for a copy of the game directions. Before starting
the game each student was randomly assigned a σ between 0 and 0.25. Students with high σ
experienced large random variation in stock biomass unrelated to their management actions.
Before playing the game the students played an 8 turn practice game. This served three
purposes: (1) they developed experience with the fishery (2) we used the data from the
practice game to identify students who didn’t understand the directions and (3) it provided
a set of “past data” for the models and students to use as a basis for making decisions in
the future.
Before the user entered their first harvest decision in the practice game, they were
presented with 3 harvest data points, and the resulting biomasses from the deterministic
version of the model underlying the simulated population dynamics, to give them some
context of the range of harvest values they could potentially enter. We chose to use the
deterministic model for this purpose so that all users saw the exact same past data before
playing the game. A description of the models used to simulate the biomass data observed
during the game is presented in the next section, titled “Simulated population dynamics.”
The game showed the user plots of harvest, estimated remaining biomass in the
fishery, and cumulative profit at each time step. See Fig. S1 in the online supplementary
information for a picture of the game display. At the beginning of each turn of the game, the
user entered an amount of biomass they wanted to harvest into a textbox, clicked enter, and
then the remaining biomass, post-harvest, grew according to the models that governed the
simulated fishery, and the result was displayed on the screen numerically. In addition, all
plots updated, adding the player’s harvest choice to the harvest plot, the resulting biomass
to the biomass plot and the new accumulated profit to the total profit plot.
The user’s score was the discounted net profit accumulated over the game, with a
discount rate of 0.03 and a constant profit of 10,000 dollars per ton of biomass caught. In
addition, the user received a bonus added to their score at the end of the game, which was
the discounted profit that would have been generated by harvesting all of the remaining
biomass left in the fishery after the game was over. The bonus prevents optimal users from
6
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harvesting everything on the last turn. Without adding the bonus, the user’s score would
be highly sensitive to their last harvest decision. This bonus is explained to the user in the
game directions (see S3 in the online supplementary information for a copy of the directions).
After a student completed their last turn, the game displayed their score in addition
to a leaderboard, which included the scores and initials of the top players in the class, up to
that point in time. The leaderboard provided an external incentive to play well. However,
the students did not receive a course grade or monetary incentives based on performance.
Throughout the game, data were stored locally on the user’s computer using browser
cookies. Upon exiting the game, these anonymous data was then sent to a server, using PHP
(a server-side programing language for web development, Welling and Thomson, 2003), and
stored in a database. These data included the time the user finished playing the game, an
anonymous user ID number, the student’s answers to the survey questions, the environmen-
tal noise variable σ, total profit (i.e. “points”) and their time series of harvest decisions,
resulting biomasses, realizations of environmental noise and measurement error, and in ad-
dition the analogous data from their practice game. By recording the environmental noise
and measurement error values, experienced by the user, we were able to compare how any
strategy (in our case strategies generated by optimization models) would have performed
playing that user’s exact instance of the game.
After playing the unstructured herring game, the student was directed via a link to
the salmon game. Using cookies, the anonymous user ID number from the herring game was
saved and recorded along with a unique user ID number for the salmon game as well. In the
salmon game, the fishery population dynamics were age-structured, so the game directions
also included information on the salmon’s life cycle, which consisted of juvenile (1 year-old)
and immature (2 year-old) fish survival and growth and adult fish (3 year-old) reproduction.
On each turn of the game, the user entered the biomass of adult and immature fish they
chose to harvest in two side-by-side textboxes. Plots of the student’s harvest and biomass
time series data were the same as for the herring fishery, except now each plot had two
curves, one for immature fish and one for adult fish. The user could not observe or harvest
juvenile biomass. See Fig. S2 for a picture of the game display in the age-structured game.
The user’s score in the age-structured game was similar to the unstructured game,
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except discounted net profit was summed over both adult and immature harvest, and the
bonus was the discounted profit that would have been generated by harvesting all of the
remaining adult biomass for three years after the game was over (it takes 3 years for the
recruits at the end of the game to return to be harvested as adults).
Another goal of this study was to collaborate with instructors to incorporate the game
into their curriculum to facilitate active learning. Therefore, while the students played each
version of this game multiple times, for pedagogical reasons, students were only asked to
try their hardest to score the most amount of points possible during their first game. After
everyone had finished their first game, they were allowed to collaborate and experiment, to
facilitate students learning the principles of conservation biology, and therefore we did not
include the students’ latter turns in the analysis.
Simulated population dynamics
The herring fish game was governed by a simple unstructured, one dimensional model, where
the manager chooses to harvest ht tons of biomass in year t, and the resulting biomass in year
t+ 1, Bt+1, is a nonlinear function of the biomass that escaped harvest in year t, R(Bt−ht),
times a log-normally distributed random number, zt, with mean one and standard deviation
σ.
Bt+1 = ztR(Bt − ht). (1)
We choose R to be the Beverton-Holt recruitment function, to exclude the possibility of
complicated chaotic and periodic dynamics in the absence of harvest,
R(B) =
b1B
1 + b2B
, (2)
where b1 is recruitment per unit biomass at low densities and b2 controls the carrying capacity
of the population.
The student managing the population observes a stock biomass of mtBt, in year
t, where mt is a log-normally distributed random variable with mean one and standard
deviation 0.025. The small random variation in mt represents measurement error in assessing
8
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the current fish abundance.
The age-structured fish game is based on the life cycle of Coho Salmon, including
three independent cohorts that undergo a three stage life cycle. Juvenile fish live in the
river and survive and grow into small fish which swim downstream to the ocean where they
mature, and finally they swim up stream to spawn and die. The manager sets a total catch of
h2,t for immature fish and h3,t for adult fish. Adult fish harvest occurs prior to recruitment,
giving population dynamics
B1,t+1 = ztR(B3,t − h3,t)
B2,t+1 = zta21B1,t
B3,t+1 = zta32(B2,t − h2,t),
(3)
where aij is the per unit biomass contribution, from age j biomass that escaped harvest, in
year t, to age i biomass, in year t+ 1.
We parameterized the two models by starting with rough estimates from the literature
and then adjusted the values so that the growth rate of our hypothetical herring (unstruc-
tured) and coho salmon (age-structured) populations were equal. The reason for using equal
growth rates is that when comparing a user’s score from managing the population in the
unstructured game to the score from the age-structured game, we wanted to make sure that
any observed difference was due to demographic structure and not due to differences in the
absolute growth rate.
The average 3 year old coho salmon weighs 8.0 pounds and the average 2 year old
salmon weighs about 3.1 pounds (Marr et al., 1944). A typical survival probability for pacific
salmon populations is 0.8 in good years and 0.28 in bad years (Worden et al., 2010). Hence,
we fixed a32 = (8lbs/3.1lbs)(0.8 + 0.28)/2 ≈ 1.4. Coho salmon are more productive than
Herring at low densities, hence we chose to lower salmon recruitment as much as “believably”
possible so that the growth rate in our salmon and herring fisheries matched. To do this, we
assumed the average survival probability of juvenile salmon was equal to the estimate for bad
years. Therefore, with the composite parameter of recruitment at low densities estimated in
(Worden et al., 2010) of 60 juveniles per spawner, we let the product of maximum recruitment
and juvenile survival be b1a21 = (0.28)(60recruits/spawner)(spawner/8lbs)(3lbs/recruit) ≈
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6.6. Because juvenile fish are not harvested or observed, the exact value of a21 and b1 are
unimportant individually, as they only affect the observed immature biomass through their
product, and therefore we arbitrarily let them equal 4.4 and 1.5, respectively, so that their
product was 6.6.
Our salmon parameters imply that at low density, the population will grow by a
factor of b1a21a32 = (6.6)(1.4) = 9.24 over 3 years. We therefore set herring maximum
population growth rate at b1 = 2.1 because 2.1
3 ≈ 9.24. The growth rate reported for
herring population dynamics ranges from 1.4−1.8 (Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987; Nøstbakken
and Bjørndal, 2003), so while our herring growth rate is high, it is not unreasonably so.
Carrying capacity is arbitrarily set to 5, 400 tons, which determines b2 for both models.
Optimal strategies and statistical analysis
Explicit formulas for the optimal harvest strategy, as a function of the parameters, is well
known for the unstructured model, and presented in Reed (1979). A similar optimal harvest
rule for the age-structured model is given by Holden and Conrad (2015). In both cases the
optimal harvest rule is a fixed escapement strategy, where escapement is the biomass that
escapes harvest. In other words, the manager leaves a fixed amount of fish in the ocean
and this fixed amount of fish is called the escapement. For the parameters in the game, the
optimal escapement is 2049 tons of fish, in the unstructured game, and 556 tons of adult fish
(and all immature fish, i.e. no immature harvest) in the age-structured game (see case 1 in
Holden and Conrad, 2015).
The first goal of the experiments was to compare the performance of users to fitted
models playing the exact same instance of the game. As a control, we compared both the
fitted models’ and users’ performance to the net discounted profit generated by the optimal
constant escapement rule specified above (i.e. the optimal strategy with the true parameters
known).
For all fitted models, parameters were initially estimated using the data generated
from the users’ eight turn practice game. In the computer’s first turn of the game, it
follows the optimal strategy (i.e., harvests the population down to the optimal escapement)
assuming these parameter estimates are true. After observing the stock biomass resulting
10
Human judgment vs. models for management
from its previous harvest, it re-estimates the parameters using the previous data along with
this new data point. It then harvests using the optimal escapement strategy based on the
new parameter estimates, and the process is continued until the game is over.
The parameter estimation for the unstructured game is performed by minimizing
sum of squared errors between the log transformed recruitment data, log [mt+1Bt+1], and log
transformed predicted recruitment under the model, log[R(mtBt − ht)], using the function
lsqcurvefit, an implementation of the trust-region-reflective algorithm, in MATLAB (MAT-
LAB, 2010). For the age-structured game, because juvenile biomass is unobservable, the
procedure is the same as above, except predicted recruitment is a21R(m3,tB3,t − h3,t) and
observed recruitment is m2,t+2B2,t+2. The transition between immature and adult biomass is
estimated similarly. It should be noted that because the mean of the lognormal measurement
error is not exactly zero, the above regression is slightly biased. However, correcting for this
small bias did not affect the results presented in this paper.
We consider fitted models with the same functional form (Beverton-Holt recruit-
ment) as the model underlying the simulated population dynamics, and in addition models
that incorrectly specify the functional form (discrete logistic and Ricker recruitment). For
the age-structured game we also considered escapement rules based on an unstructured
Beverton-Holt recruitment model (as in (1)). To estimate the parameters for this model, the
computer minimizes the sum squared error between the log transformed aggregate biomass
data, log[m2,t+1B2,t+1 +m3,t+1B3,t+1], and the predicted biomass, log[R(m2,tB2,t +m3,tB3,t−
h2,t − h3,t)]. It then harvests the two age classes in proportion to their respective observed
biomasses.
To test whether the percent of optimal profit achieved by the user was correlated with
the answers to the survey questions, the standard deviation of environmental stochasticity,
and net profit generated during the practice game, not including the bonus, we fitted a linear
regression model, using the function lm in R (R Core Team, 2012).
Another goal of the experiments was to analyze what strategies the users were deploy-
ing and how well different strategies performed compared to others. We compared the user’s
behavior to three idealized candidate strategies: constant harvest, proportional harvest and
constant escapement. Constant harvest means the user enters the same harvest at every
11
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time step (harvest = β, where β is the user’s mean harvest). Under a proportional harvest
strategy the user harvests a constant proportion of the biomass (harvest = β· biomass, where
β is their harvest proportion). Constant escapement, means the user lets a constant amount
of biomass escape harvest (harvest = 0 if biomass ≤ β, harvest = biomass −β if biomass
> β, where β is the biomass they let escape harvest). After fitting these three models to
the harvest vs. biomass data generated by each user during their game play, the users were
categorized into the three strategy classes based on which model fit had the lowest sum of
squared errors. For the age-structured game we repeated the above analysis on adult harvest,
for simplicity (because exclusive adult harvest is optimal), but the results reported below
are similar if total harvest is used instead.
Results
Unstructured population game
All human subjects achieved less discounted net profit than would be achieved using the
optimal constant escapement strategy with known parameters (Fig. 1a). This was not 100
percent certain to occur, because the optimal strategy is only optimal in expectation, and
therefore is not necessarily the most profitable strategy during a run of atypical years. On
average, humans scored 65.4 percent of the discounted net profit generated using the optimal
constant escapement strategy, and only 11.0 percent of humans achieved over 90 percent of
this optimal expected net profit.
Most users performed worse than the escapement rules generated from the models
with parameters estimated from the historical harvest data (Fig. 1bcd) even if the model
made incorrect assumptions about the underlying recruitment function (Fig. 1cd).
The only significant predictor of the user’s performance was their performance in the
practice game (p < 0.001). Simple linear regression of the user’s percent optimal profit
on practice game score explained 28 percent of the variation in the user’s optimal profit,
(R2 = 0.28, see Fig. S6).
When the practice score was removed as a predictor, the user’s level of study (fresh-
12
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Figure 1: The percent of the mathematical model’s total profit achieved by the user, in the
unstructured game, when the mathematical model is (a) Beverton-Holt with true parameters,
i.e. perfect information (b) Beverton-Holt but with parameters estimated from the data, (c)
discrete logistic with parameters estimated from the data and (d) Ricker with parameters
estimated from the data. For example, a value of 50 percent means the user generated half
the profit the mathematical model did managing the exact same instance of the game. A
value of 200 percent means the user generated twice as much profit as the model.
man, senior, PhD etc.), academic field of study, and standard deviation of the observed
environmental stochasticity, still did not significantly correlate with the user’s performance.
Two predictors were significant in this model. The five students who responded “I am consid-
ering a career in fisheries management, but have no experience” generated more profit than
students that responded “I am not considering a career in fisheries management” (p = 0.033)
and students in Cornell’s “Environmental Conservation” course scored significantly higher
13
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than the students in Ithaca College’s “Principles of Biology” course (p = 0.041). However,
a linear model with just these two predictor variables only explained four percent of the
variation in user performance. It should also be noted that if we group the two students who
responded that they actually had fisheries management experience with those five students
who indicated a career interest but no experience, the answer to the management experience
question does not significantly correlate with the users’ scores. This suggests that the sample
size for students who were considering careers in fisheries management may be too small to
draw any meaningful conclusions.
Classifying the humans’ harvest strategies into the three categories: constant harvest,
proportional harvest and constant escapement, people harvested a constant proportion (129
users) much more often than allowing a constant escapement (30 users) (Fig. 2). Only
39 users were classified as constant harvesters. Many users repeated their harvest decision
from the previous turn and the average user only entered 10 unique harvest values over
the course of the 21 turn game (Fig. S7). All five users who indicated a career interest in
fisheries management were classified as proportional harvesters. Of the two users with actual
management experience, one was a constant harvester and the other was a proportional
harvester. The optimal policy type (constant escapement) was the only strategy not used
by students with fisheries interests or experience.
Forty-five percent of humans allowed less fish to escape harvest, on average, than the
optimal value (Fig. 3a). In other words 45 percent of users over-fished the population while
55 percent of users under-fished the population. If we were to re-classify users whose median
escapement was within q percent of the optimal value as neither under nor over-fishing,
the result that there are roughly the same number of over and under-fishers holds for all
q < 70. So while many humans harvested sub-optimally, over and under-fishing mistakes
were equally likely.
Students who used constant escapement strategies (circles in Fig. 3a) were more
likely to over-fish than to under-fish. Proportional harvesters (triangles in Fig. 3a) both
over and under-fished and constant harvesters (pluses in Fig. 3a) were much more likely to
under-fish. Note that constant harvesters really can only under-fish, because if they were to
over-fish, the biomass would eventually decrease to the point where their constant harvest
14
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would crash the fishery, at which point they would have to abandon the constant harvest
strategy.
When harvest rules generated by the fitted Beverton-Holt recruitment model per-
formed poorly, this was most often due to over-fishing rather than under-fishing (Fig. 3b).
Poor model performance was due to a combination of two reasons: (1) during the practice
game the user allowed similar amounts of biomass to escape harvest on every turn, generat-
ing poor data for model fitting, and (2) the standard deviation of the environmental noise
was high (Fig. 4). When both of these conditions are true, the data can misrepresent the
recruitment function (Fig. 4b compared to 4c) and lead to a poor escapement strategy.
Despite the poor escapement strategies that sometimes resulted from the fitted models, they
still were less frequent and generated more long term discounted profit than the worst users
(compare the low points in Fig. 3a to 3b).
In the supplementary information we show how quickly the parameter estimates,
during the Beverton-Holt model fitting, converged to the true values governing the game
dynamics. In general, poor model fits were rather common. For example, when decisions
were made based on the Beverton-Holt model with parameters estimated from biomass
observations during the game, even after all 21 turns, the estimated value for b2 was off by
more than 25 percent over 40 percent of the time (see turn 21 in S8a). Parameter estimation
of b1 was more accurate (S8b), and for both parameters the poor estimates improved as time
moved forward (S8ab). Still, in many of the cases where parameter estimates were off, the
fitted models made more profitable decisions than the users, despite the poor model fit (1b).
15
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Figure 2: (a-c) An example user’s harvest decisions vs. the biomass they observed prior
to making those decisions in the unstructured game. The black line is the best model fit,
which for user 13 (a) is a proportional harvest strategy (PH), for user 120 (b) is a constant
escapement strategy (CE), for user 138 (c) is a constant harvest strategy (CH). (d) The sum
of squared error when fitting each user’s harvest data, in the unstructured game, to a constant
escapement model vs. fitting a proportional harvest model on a log-log scale. Points to the
right of the 1:1 line represent users whose variation in harvest is better explained by constant
escapement than proportional harvest. The blue triangle and red circle in (d) correspond to
the proportional harvester and constant escaper in (a) and (b) respectively.
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Figure 3: (a) The profit generated by each user, in the unstructured game, relative to the
net profit the optimal strategy with perfect information would generate in the corresponding
instance of the game, as a function of the median amount of fish the user let escape harvest.
The red circles, blue triangles and green pluses are for users who used constant escapement
(CE), proportional harvest (PH), and constant harvest (CH) strategies, respectively. (b)
the analogous proportion of optimal profit generated by the fitted model vs. the median of
escapements chosen by the model after it fit a recruitment function to the data during each
turn of the game. The dotted line is optimal escapement under perfect information.
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Figure 4: (a) The profit generated from the strategies using the fitted Beverton-Holt model
relative to the optimal profit under perfect information, as a function of the standard de-
viation in practice game escapement, generated by the user. Dark and light circles are for
instances of the games with low and high levels of environmental stochasticity respectively.
(b-c) The true recruitment function (dashed line) and fitted recruitment function (solid line)
for two instances of the game, [these examples are highlighted by a red circle and blue triangle
in (a)], where the fitted model generates unprofitable escapement strategies (b - red circle)
and profitable ones (c - blue triangle). The open symbols are recruitment data generated by
the user in the practice game, whereas the smaller filled points are generated by the fitted
model when playing the actual game.
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Age-structured population game
In the age-structured model, the average user achieved 63.6 percent of the optimal profit
achieved by a model with perfect information. The most profitable user scored only 84.3
percent of the optimal profit, in comparison to the best performer in the unstructured pop-
ulation game who scored over 95 percent of optimal profit. On the opposite end of the
spectrum the worst users in the unstructured population game only scored 7.2 percent of
optimal profit, while in the age-structured game the worst user scored 11.8 percent of op-
timal profit. A full distribution of the relative performance of the users compared to the
optimal policy in the age-structured game is given in Fig. 5. The improved performance by
the worse players, despite the age-structured game being more complex, was due to the fact
that this game includes three independent cohorts. Even if one or two cohorts were driven
to low levels, some harvest could be achieved in the remaining turns as long as one cohort
was still abundant. A player could make one very bad decision, and learn from it, without
collapsing the entire fishery.
The user’s performance in the age-structured game was mainly determined by their
overall fishing pressure and not their decision of which age class to fish (compare Fig. 6a to
6b). The majority of users harvested more immature biomass than adult biomass, despite
exclusive adult harvest being the optimal strategy (6b). Similar to the simple unstructured
game, users who deployed a constant escapement strategy (for adults) were more likely to
over-fish (6a).
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Figure 5: The percent of the mathematical model’s total profit achieved by the user, in
the age-structured game, when the mathematical model is (a) age-structured with true
parameters, i.e. perfect information (b) age-structured but with parameters estimated from
the data, and (c) unstructured with parameters estimated from the aggregated (immature
+ adult) biomass data. For example, a value of 50 percent means the user generated half
the profit the mathematical model did, managing the exact same instance of the game. A
value of 200 percent means the user generated twice as much profit as the model.
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Figure 6: (ac) The proportion of optimal profit, in the age-structured game, generated by (a)
the user and (c) fitted unstructured model, with parameters estimated from the aggregated
(immature + adult) biomass data, for each game as a function of the median escapement
chosen. (b) The proportion of optimal profit generated by the user as a function of the
median proportion of harvest allocated to adult biomass during the game.
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The average escapement strategies resulting from the age structure model with pa-
rameters estimated from historical data (fitted age structure model) achieved 98.4 percent
of the optimal profit, even better than in the unstructured game. Even in the fitted model’s
lowest performing game, it achieved 78.9 percent of optimal discounted net profit, far better
than even the median user. This is for two reasons (1) users in the practice game tended
not to let the same amount of adult fish escape harvest every turn, producing good data for
model fitting, and (2) the transition rate from immatures to adults was always estimated
well, because it is a single parameter that can be estimated independently from recruitment,
whereas the recruitment function requires two parameters to be estimated simultaneously.
The result of point (2) is that the models always fished from the correct age class.
The average escapement strategy, generated by fitting a one dimensional unstructured
population model to the aggregate age-structured data, achieved 72.3 percent of the optimal
profit. This represents a 13.5 percent gain in profit over the average human operating solely
on intuition. Only 58 users, out of 172, generated more profit than would have been obtained
by harvesting based on the fitted unstructured model. However, for instances of the game
where the unstructured model generated low discounted net profit, the model’s proposed
escapement rule crashed the fishery, by letting very little biomass escape harvest. These
strategies generated less discounted net profit than the least profitable users (compare the
lowest points in Fig. 6a to 6c).
Discussion
Many mathematical tools exist to improve decision making in environmental management,
including methods from optimization and optimal control. Yet managers are still resistant to
using these tools to develop management plans, and instead rely mainly on their experience
and intuitive judgment (Johnson and Williams, 2015). At least one reason for this is that it
is often unclear what a manager may gain by using quantitative methods, especially if the
dynamics of the managed system are not well understood.
In this paper we studied optimal escapement strategies for the management of sim-
ulated fisheries, developed using simplified models of fish stock dynamics, and tested their
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performance compared to humans managing the simulated population using only their expe-
rience and judgment. The models performed better than the users, on average, even when the
models mis-specified recruitment or state variables. However, in the age-structured game,
the worst outcomes produced by the simplified unstructured model were worse than the
worst outcomes generated by the users.
Each quantitative model-based approach to managing the simulated fishery used a
single equation or system of equations with unknown parameters. Alternatively, a manager
could develop a set of candidate models representing alternative hypotheses about the sys-
tem (e.g. an age-structured and unstructured model) and then require quantitative methods
resolve structural uncertainty (Williams, 2001; Nichols et al., 2015). Our results on using
unstructured models to manage age-structured populations are an example of a worse case
scenario where the a manager’s candidate model set does not contain a model that approxi-
mates the system well. Even in such a case, on average, quantitative methods out performed
human judgment in our experiment.
Users and fitted models tended to make different types of mistakes. An equal number
of users over-fished vs. under-fished the stock. However, when management based on fitted
models failed, it was almost always due to overfishing.
We found that even when the model is perfectly specified, and only needs parameter
estimates from the data, it still can perform worse than a human using intuition alone,
especially when environmental stochasticity is high and prior management decisions have
all been similar. The lack of data with sufficient variability in stock abundance to estimate
parameters well is likely common in fisheries management because overexploited populations
are ubiquitous, and therefore the time series data of fish stock abundances may often contain
only population sizes well below carrying capacity. In such cases, recruitment curves may
often be incorrectly estimated and our simple models will naively suggest that it is optimal
to keep overfishing. This suggests that passive adaptive management, choosing the best
strategy, based on the current knowledge of the system, to optimize some objective, without
any regards to the information gained by deploying that action can potentially lead to poor
performance even when model structure is correctly specified.
Our results suggest that probing the system by performing an action that is subop-
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timal given the manager’s current belief about the system, but that will reveal information
that improves management in the future might be desirable in such scenarios. Incorporating
the economic benefits of learning from experimentation explicitly into the optimal decision
problem, known as active adaptive management, has been studied within the context of har-
vested populations. However, due to computational limitations solutions are always limited
to cases with one of the three following assumptions: (1) both the probability distribution
specifying environmental stochasticity and all parameters in the recruitment function are
perfectly known, except for a single parameter to be estimated from the data (Walters,
1981; Ludwig and Walters, 1982), (2) there is a small number of candidate models, with
all parameters fixed within each model (Williams, 2001), or (3) only a small number of ac-
tions and system states are admissible (e.g. action = harvest or not, fishery state = robust,
vulnerable, or collapsed, Hauser and Possingham, 2008).
Unfortunately, the problem of choosing an optimal escapement level in our game, us-
ing the principles of active adaptive management, is computationally infeasible given current
algorithms and computing power because our game allows for an infinite set of possible ac-
tions and states, governed by unknown parameters and unknown variability in environmental
noise.
It is rather alarming that even in the most optimistic case, where the underlying
dynamic model is known and parameters have to be estimated from the data, passive adaptive
management can fail to achieve desirable results. However, the alternative of letting humans
manage our simulated fishery based solely on their experience and judgment typically led
to much worse outcomes. Because mathematical models usually improved management
outcomes in our experiment, we would recommend modeling be more widely adopted in
management. However, models should not necessarily be considered as a replacement for
manager expertise. Our results show that in some cases human intervention may be required
when models appear to recommend risky management decisions.
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Table S1: Below is a copy of the survey.
How many times have you played this game before?
• possible answers: “0”,“1”, “2”,... “15”, “more than 15”, “I’ve only played a different
version of this game”
What best describes your education level?
• possible answers: “No college”, “Some college or associates degree, but not currently in
college”, “Freshman (1st year)”, “Sophomore (2nd year)”, “Junior (3rd year)”, “Senior
(4th year or greater)”, “completed Bachelor’s degree”, “In PhD, MS, MA, or MEng
program”, “In other post-bachelor program (e.g. JD, MBA, MD, MFA)”, “completed
MS, MA, or MEng degree”, “completed PhD degree”, “completed other post-bachelor
degree (e.g. JD, MBA, MD, MFA)”
What best describes the field of study for your highest degree?
• possible answers: “No college”, “Math, Statistics, or Computation”,“ Ecology, Natu-
ral Resources, or Environmental Biology”, “Economics”, “Political Science or Govern-
ment”,“ Environmental Engineering”, “Other Engineering”, “Other Biology”, “Physi-
cal Sciences”, “Social Sciences”, “Humanities”, “undecided”
What best describes your experience fishing?
• possible answers: “I have never fished”,“I fish or have fished, but less than once per
year”, “I fish recreationally, at least once per year, but not for a living”, “I fish or have
fished for a living”
What best describes your experience managing fisheries?
• possible answers: “I have work/intern experience managing fisheries, more than 10
years”, “I have work/intern experience managing fisheries, between 10 and 2 years”, “I
have work/intern experience managing fisheries, less than 2 years”, “ I am considering
a career in fisheries management, but have no experience”, “ I am not considering a
career in fisheries management”
Do you have work experience managing any (non-human) biological population outside of
fisheries?
• possible answers: “I have work/intern experience managing game (hunted popula-
tions)”, “I have work/intern experience in conservation biology”, “I have work/intern
experience in forestry”, “I have work/intern experience in agricultural management”,
“I have work/intern experience managing other biological populations”, “I am consid-
ering careers in managing biological populations, but have no experience”, “I am not
considering careers in managing biological populations”
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Figure S1: Game play for the unstructured herring fish game.
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Figure S2: Game play for age-structured salmon fish game.
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Figure S3: Directions for unstructured herring fish game.
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Figure S4: Directions for age-structured salmon fish game.
34
Human judgment vs. models for management 1 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
5
10
15
20
25
Game performance
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ey
Intro Conservation Bio, Cornell
Intro Bio, Ithaca College
STEM Colloquium, Cornell
Figure S5: A histogram of percent of optimal profit achieved by the users for each class.
Note the histograms are overlaid rather than stacked.
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Figure S6: Proportion of optimal profit generated by the user in the actual game vs. Pro-
portion of optimal profit generated by the user in the practice, not including the bonus, for
(a) the one dimensional game and (b) the age-structured game.
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Figure S7: (a) A histogram of the number of times the user entered same harvest value, in
the one dimensional game, as they did on the previous turn. (b) A histogram of the number
of unique harvest entries they made over the course of the entire game.
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Figure S8: Percent of curve fits where (a) the estimate for b2 was within 25 percent of the
true value and (b) the estimate for b1 was within 15 percent of the true value, for each turn
during the game.
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(c)
Number of game turns completed
Figure S9: (a) The error in the estimate for b1, |b1,estimate − b1,actual|/b1,actual, on log base
ten scale when fitting a Beverton-Holt curve through the observed biomass data. A value of
zero means the error is the same order of magnitude as the true parameter value. A value
of negative one means the estimate is within ten percent of the true value. The red line
corresponds to the error being within 25 percent of the true value. (b) The error in the b1
estimate on log 10 scale. (c) The error in the chosen escapement value with the estimates
for b1 and b2 relative to optimal escapement.
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